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Only days after his inauguration as U.S. President, Donald J. Trump
withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a
“mega” regional free trade agreement that would have established the
world’s largest free trade zone. Although President Trump announced that
the withdrawal was justified because the TPP was an unfair agreement, the
Trump Administration seems to have ignored or been unaware of the negative
consequences of the decision: (1) as a consequence of the U.S. withdrawal,
China has achieved a major strategic advantage in Asia through its own rival
free trade agreement and now will be able to write the rules for trade in Asia
and possibly beyond; and (2) the TPP would have resulted in significant
economic gains to the United States as supported by a large body of economic
studies analyzed in this article. Although the U.S. withdrawal has harmed its
own interests, the decision is reversible because the United States can rejoin
the TPP. While the path to reentry seems smooth at the moment, there is
urgency for U.S. action. Reentering the TPP could become much more
difficult if China first joins as the United States will need the approval of all
TPP members, including China, to rejoin.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 30, 2017, only ten days after his inauguration as U.S.
President, Donald J. Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), a “mega” regional trade agreement (RTA) consisting of
twelve nations encompassing most of Asia and approximately 40% of world
trade.1 The U.S. withdrawal terminated an arduous nearly eight year effort by
the Obama Administration to create the world’s largest free trade zone.2 The
1

Dave Sherwood, Eleven Nations – But Not U.S. – to Sign Trans-Pacific Trade Deal¸ REUTERS
(Mar. 8, 2018, 1:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/trade-tpp/eleven-nations-but-not-us-to-sign-trans-pacific-trade-deal-idUSL2N1QN0S7. For the full text of the TPP, see TPP Full
Text, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements
/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) [hereinafter TPP].
2
Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Trade Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trumptrade-nafta.html.
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reason given by the Trump Administration for withdrawal is that TPP is an
unfair agreement that harms U.S. interests.3 This reason is linked to President
Trump’s “America First” trade policies that are based on a theory of
economic nationalism and protectionism.4 These policies reflect the belief
that international trade is a zero-sum game, and that the United States has
long been the victim of “unfair” trade agreements that benefit trade partners
at the expense of the U.S.5 In his inaugural address, President Trump
indicated that U.S. policy would take a different direction under his
administration: “We must protect our borders from the ravages of other
countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our
jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.”6
The President’s trade policies are elaborated in the President’s 2017
National Trade Policy Agenda7 submitted by the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) and the chief U.S. official on trade policy. The USTR
declared:
The overarching purpose of our trade policy – the guiding
principle behind all of our actions in this key area – will be to
expand trade in a way that is freer and fairer for all Americans.
Every action we take with respect to trade will be designed to
increase our economic growth, promote job creation in the United
States, promote reciprocity with our trading partners, strengthen
our manufacturing base and our ability to defend ourselves, and
expand our agricultural and services industry exports.8
3

See Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the TransPacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017)
(withdrawing from the TPP because of the need for “fair and economically beneficial trade
deals” that serve the interests of the American people).
4
See Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World Trade Organization,
B.U. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1–2) (on file with the Boston University
International Law Journal) [hereinafter Chow, Unilateralism] (analyzing the Trump administration’s international trade policies).
5
See id. (characterizing the Trump administration’s trade policies as economic nationalism
wherein the U.S. defends against unfavorable trade deals by seeking new agreements
intended to promote U.S. interests).
6
Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/ [https://perma.cc/LEQ9-5VL7].
7
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., THE PRESIDENT’S 2017 TRADE POLICY AGENDA 1 (2017),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2017/2017-tradepolicy-agenda-and-2016 [https://perma.cc/6GD7-PURP] [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REP., 2017 TRADE POLICY].
8
Id.
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In order to achieve what is termed “fair” trade,9 the USTR identified
four priorities:
(1) defend U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy; (2)
strictly enforce U.S. trade laws; (3) use all possible sources
of leverage to encourage other countries to open their
markets to U.S. exports of goods and services, and provide
adequate and effective protection and enforcement of U.S.
intellectual property rights; and (4) negotiate new and better
trade deals with countries in key markets around the world.10
Under the first priority, the United States has indicated that it will
ignore international law, including the rules and decisions of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), when it harms U.S. interests.11 Under the second
priority the United States has asserted the right to impose unilateral trade
sanctions in the form of increased tariffs against many of its trading
partners.12 These sanctions apply not only to trade with China, but also to
nations such as Canada, Mexico, Germany, and Japan with which the United
States has friendly relations.13 Under the third, and fourth priorities, the
9

The concept of “fair” trade has its roots in political discourse in 19th century Britain, but it also
characterized U.S. criticism of trading relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the
1980’s: “Congressman, businessmen, editorialists and the media have repeatedly emphasized
fairness in trade, ‘level playing fields’ and reciprocity of access as a pre-condition for a trade
regime to be acceptable to the United States.” See Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Douglas A. Irwin, The
Return of the Reciprocitarians – US Trade Policy Today, 10 WORLD ECON. 109, 117–18 (1987).
See also Patrick K. O’Brien & Geoffrey Allen Pigman, Free Trade, British Hegemony and the
International Economic Order in the Nineteenth Century, 18 REV. INT’L STUD. 89, 105–107
(1992) (discussing the 19th century origins of Britain’s fair trade movement).
10
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 TRADE POLICY, supra note 7, at 2.
11
See Chow, Unilateralism, supra note 4, at 6–7 (arguing that the Trump administration has
interpreted WTO rules as allowing the U.S. to unilaterally void WTO decisions that add or
diminish rights set forth in WTO agreements).
12
See id. at 14 (pointing to the U.S. issuance of unilateral trade sanctions against China
despite WTO prohibitions).
13
When the Trump Administration announced its tariffs, they were generally applicable. See,
e.g., Press Release, President Trump Approves Relief for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar Cell
Manufacturers, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2018/january/president-trump-approves-relief-us [https://perma.
cc/X9DL-NB5A] (announcing new tariffs on all imported washing machines and solar cells). C.f.
Proclamation No. 9704, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg.
11,619, 11,619–20 (Mar. 8, 2018) (announcing generally applicable tariffs on aluminum imports,
except those from Canada and Mexico); Proclamation No. 9705, Adjusting Imports of Steel into
the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625, 11,625–26 (Mar. 8, 2018) (announcing generally
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United States is using the threat of economic sanctions to induce its trading
partners to make trade concessions and revise existing trade agreements that
are supposedly “unfavorable” to the United States.14 For example, after the
United States announced across-the-board additional tariffs on steel and
aluminum on March 1, 2018, South Korea immediately agreed to revise the
U.S.-Korea (KORUS) free trade agreement by agreeing to export less steel
and aluminum to the United States in order to avoid the tariffs.15 Treasury
Secretary Steven Mnuchin declared, “I think the strategy has worked, quite
frankly. We announced the tariff. We said we were going to proceed. But,
again, we said we’d simultaneously negotiate.” Secretary Mnuchin boasted
that this was a “win-win” situation for both countries,16 suggesting that the
United States is hoping to duplicate this approach to induce other countries
to revise their trade agreements. Some countries claim that the United States
is not negotiating but is using the threat of trade sanctions to intimidate its
trading partners to capitulate to new trade concessions.17
applicable tariffs on steel imports, except those from Canada and Mexico). But see Everett
Rosenfeld, US Extends Tariff Exemptions for European Union and Other Allies, CNBC (Apr. 30,
2018, 8:14 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/30/us-extends-tariff-exemptions-for-eu-andother-allies.html (while the tariffs were applicable to all counties, multiple exemptions were made
for allies) [https://perma.cc/9AVZ-LWFC] (reporting that the U.S. has extended deadlines for
negotiations on foreign exemptions for steel and aluminum tariffs).
14
See Chow, Unilateralism, supra note 4, at 20–22 (reviewing the legality of the Trump
administration’s threat of trade sanctions to induce revision of trade agreements and the use
of this practice against South Korea).
15
On March 28, 2018, South Korea agreed to limit its exports of steel and aluminum to the U.S.
to 2.68 tons of steel exports to the U.S. per year roughly 70% of the annual average import volume
of steel exports from Korea to the U.S. for the years 2015–17. See Alan Rappeport & Jim
Tankersley, Trump Gets First Major Trade Deal as South Korea Looks to Avoid Tariffs, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/business/south-korea-us-tariffs.html
[https://perma.cc/9Z5B-6YR8]; also Press Release, Joint Statement by the United States Trade
Representative Robert E. Lighthizer and Republic of Korea Minister for Trade Hyun Chong Kim,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2018/march/joint-statement-united-states-trade [https://perma.cc/HHP8-DV
ZF] (announcing agreement revising the terms of the KORUS agreement and exempting South
Korea from steel tariffs); see also Fact Sheet, New U.S. Trade Policy and National Security
Outcomes with the Republic of Korea, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://
ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018/march/new-us-trade-policy-and-nat
ional [https://perma.cc/4NXT-6R6Z] (summarizing the outcome of the trade agreement revision).
16
Id.
17
See Hans von der Burchard & Jakob Hanke, Trump is Winning Trade War — for Now,
POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2018, 5:07 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/president-donald-trump-win
ning-the-trade-war-for-now-steel-aluminum-tariffs/ [https://perma.cc/PY9B-J6N6] (reporting EU
objections to the Trump administration’s threats to impose tariff sanctions in exchange for more
favorable trade agreement terms).
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The revision of KORUS proceeded at a breakneck pace lasting only
a few weeks,18 but revising a multilateral agreement such as TPP with twelve
members could prove complex and time consuming.19 In the case of TPP, the
U.S. strategy is to first withdraw from the agreement and then to negotiate
bilateral agreements with each of the other eleven nations.20 Once limited to
a bilateral negotiation with a single trading partner, the United States will be
able to use its economic clout in a one-on-one negotiation to obtain a new
bilateral agreement that will contain terms favorable to the United States.21
Although the U.S. withdrawal was originally thought to signal the
demise of TPP, the remaining 11 nations completed new negotiations and, on
March 8, 2018, the revised agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also known as TPP11, was signed by
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.22 CPTPP is scheduled to come into effect
within two years if all requirements are met.23
18

The trade sanctions were announced on March 1, 2018 and South Korea agreed to trade
concessions and revisions of KORUS on March 27, 2018. See Press Release, U.S. Trade
Representative, supra note 15 (announcing conclusion of trade sanctions); Ana Seanson,
Trump to Impose Sweeping Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018), www.
nytimes.com/2018/03/01/business/trump-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/JH4F-J7RR] (reporting on President Trump’s announced intent to impose steel and aluminum tariffs).
19
See Christopher Moser & Andrew Rose, Why Do Trade Negotiations Take So Long?, VOX:
CEPR POLICY PORTAL (June 8, 2012), https://voxeu.org/article/why-do-trade-negotiations-takeso-long [https://perma.cc/4GFA-MQCS] (finding that trade “negotiations take significantly longer
when they involve more countries, especially if the countries are spread across different regions”).
20
The USTR has stated that “[a]s a general matter, we believe that [U.S.] goals can be best
accomplished by focusing on bilateral negotiations rather than multilateral negotiations –
and by renegotiating and revising trade agreements when our goals are not being met.”
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 TRADE POLICY, supra note 7, at 1.
21
While the United States has negotiating leverage in bilateral negotiations, extracting a favorable
deal under a bilateral negotiation could bring negotiating states in violation of the WTO. See
Harry G. Broadman, Trump’s Misplaced Penchant for Bilateral Trade Deals, FORBES (Jan. 31,
2018 10:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/harrybroadman/2018/01/31/trumps-misplacedpenchant-for-bilateral-trade-deals/#774ca5de57b9 [https://perma.cc/L83U-437V] (noting that
the WTO requires members negotiating PTAs to comply with WTO rules, and that WTO
members that create WTO-inconsistent agreements may face sanctions from members at large).
Bilateral negotiations can also harm the United States, as a collection of them prevents
harmonization of international trade rules that promote growth. See id. (pointing to the difficulties
in aligning bilateral and multi-lateral agreements in a globalized market that hinders compliance).
22
Tim McDonald, Asia-Pacific Trade Deal Signed by 11 Nations, BBC (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43326314 [https://perma.cc/C4DA-XY58].
23
The CPTPP will enter into force sixty days after the signatories have ratified it or, if this does
not occur not within two years of its initial signing, when at least half of the signatories accounting
for 85% of the combined GDP of the original signatories in 2013 have signed it. Comprehensive

Vol. 4:1]

United States Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership

43

While the United States’ decision to withdraw from TPP is consistent
with its announced trade policies, the United States seems to have overlooked
the potential harms to its immediate and long term economic and strategic
interests. First, the Trump Administration seems to have ignored a large body
of economic research indicating that TPP would have resulted in significantly
increased trade and economic development opportunities for the United
States and other TPP countries.24 These are opportunities that may now
redound in some form to the benefit of the remaining eleven members, but in
which the United States will not share. In addition, it is unclear whether and
how long it will take for the United States to negotiate bilateral trade
agreements with the remaining eleven nations. Even if this were to occur, it
is unclear whether these agreements will result in equivalent trade benefits.
Second, in addition to economic benefits from TPP, there are also significant
strategic U.S. interests that may be compromised by a withdrawal.25 TPP was
designed to allow the United States to create new legal standards for trade in
Asia, China’s own backyard, which would far exceed those set forth by the
WTO.26 Not only would TPP have established higher standards for Asia as a
whole but TPP was created with the specific goal of containing China, the
United States’ chief rival in trade.27 It is no exaggeration to say that China
was the target of every major provision in TPP.28 Moreover, the United States
deliberately excluded China from the TPP negotiations so that China could
not challenge or dilute the new standards in TPP.29 The United States’ plan
was to complete TPP without China and then confront China with a difficult
and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 30.5, opened for signature Mar. 8, 2018 [hereinafter CPTPP], https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreementsconcluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacificpartnership-text/.
24
See infra Part III.
25
See infra Part II.
26
See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: DETAILED
SUMMARY OF U.S. OBJECTIVES 5, 7–9 (Sept. 2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPPDetailed-Summary-of-US-Objectives.pdf (rejecting trade rules and practices dictated by
China and listing objectives that address tariffs, reciprocal access, and state-owned
enterprises in addition to changes that “build on WTO commitments” in several areas).
27
See Daniel C.K. Chow, How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to
Contain China in International Trade, 17 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 372, 372–74 (2017)
[hereinafter Chow, Trans-Pacific Partnership] (explaining how the provisions in the TPP
and China’s exclusion from the negotiations “w[ere] no accident, but instead w[ere] a
deliberate ploy by the U.S. to limit China’s growing global trade influence”).
28
See id. at 374 (arguing that containing China was the U.S.’s central focus for trade
negotiations).
29
See id. at 372–73 (positing that the U.S. wanted to dictate the terms of the TPP to limit
China’s trade influence).
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choice: reject TPP and lose the trade benefits that would come with
membership or join TPP and be subject to tough new standards that were
specifically designed to address U.S. concerns about some of China’s most
controversial trade practices.30 Of course, China did not stand by idly while
the United States embarked on this plan; China was creating a competing
RTA of its own for Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP), which by some measures would be even larger than TPP.31
Returning the favor, China excluded the United States from the negotiations
for RCEP.32 By rejecting TPP, the United States may now have relinquished
this strategic goal of containing China, giving China, armed with its own
RTA designed to offset TPP, the clear upper hand in Asia.33
This article will develop these themes as follows. Part II will discuss
the background to TPP and how it includes standards exceeding those of the
WTO that were designed in significant part to limit China. Part III will
examine the large body of economic research that shows the expected
economic benefits of TPP for the United States and its other members. Part
IV will discuss China’s competing RTA for Asia and how China may have
gained the advantage with the U.S. rejection of TPP. The article concludes
by examining future courses of action for the United States.
I. GOALS OF TPP
A. History of TPP
TPP, signed in early-October 2015, would have been the largest RTA
struck in the past two decades, and along with the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) that was under negotiation between the United
30

See id. at 375 (stating that the TPP placed China in the difficult position of either choosing
to “suffer losses in international trade by refusing to join the TPP, or it can join the TPP and
be subject to the humiliation of having to abide by rules written by the U.S. with the express
intent of containing China”).
31
See Rosalind Mathieson, Agreeing on RCEP — China’s Favorite Trade Deal — Set to
Drag into 2018, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/14/
business/agreeing-rcep-chinas-favorite-trade-deal-set-drag-2018/#.W1oOT9JJGUk [https://per
ma.cc/MQM5-2ZTW] (reporting on the renewed focus on the RCEP following the United
States’s withdrawal from the TPP).
32
See id. (stating the United Statates was not included in the negotiations).
33
See Freddie Kleiner, Trump Leaves Asia Door Open for China to Dominate Trade, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2fe572fc-ff39-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30 (discussing
how the Trump Administration’s withdrawal puts the United States’ influence at risk).
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States and European Union (EU),34 it represented an important new direction
in trade liberalization.
In 2014, TPP countries accounted for approximately 36% of the world’s
economy, and 23% of world trade.35 If ratified, TPP was anticipated to reduce
more than 18,000 tariffs, including many agricultural trade barriers.36 In 2014,
the eleven other members of TPP, accounted for $680 billion worth of U.S.
exports, with Canada, Japan and Mexico accounting for 85% of the total.37
TPP, and other “mega”-trade deals such as TTIP, have emerged
amidst uncertainty about the global trading system and the future of the
WTO. “Starting in the early 2000s, the rate of growth of global trade slowed
relative to” GDP growth, and following the “great recession” trade was not
driving growth of either industrialized or emerging economies.38 In the period
2012 to 2016, the volume of world trade grew by only 3% a year, less than
half the average rate of expansion of 7.6% in the pre-financial crisis period,
reaching a low of 2.4% in 2016.39 Also, despite limited progress in the WTO
with agreements to simplify customs rules and eliminate agricultural export
subsidies being signed in December of 2013 (Bali Ministerial Conference) and
34

See Gabriel Felbermayr et al., Macroeconomic Potentials of Transatlantic Free Trade: A
High Resolution Perspective for Europe and the World, 30 ECON. POL’Y 491, 493–494
(2015) (stating that the proposed TPP plan would result in the “largest free trade area in the
world” with significant worldwide impact).
35
Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the TPP: New Estimates,
in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES
6, 6 (2016), https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/assessing-trans-pacific-partnershipvolume-1-market-access-and-sectoral [hereinafter Petri & Plummer, Economic Effects].
36
OFFICE OF THE U. S. TRADE REP., 18,000 TAX CUTS ON MADE-IN-AMERICA EXPORTS: A
GUIDE TO HOW TAX CUTS WILL BENEFIT EXPORTING IN YOUR STATES (2015), https://ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/TPP-Guide-to-18000-Tax-Cuts.pdf; see also Caroline Freund et al., Tariff
Liberalization, in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND
SECTORAL ISSUES 31, 31 (2016), https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/assessing-transpacific-partnership-volume-1-market-access-and-sectoral (finding that implementation of the
TPP would result in the immediate elimination of nearly 75% of non-zero tariffs, and the
elimination of 99% of non-zero tariffs following full implementation).
37
See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44489, THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP): KEY PROVISIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2015)
(summarizing the export and import stastistics among the 11 prospective TPP members
compared to the U.S.).
38
Bernard Hoekman, Trade and Growth – End of an Era?, in THE GLOBAL TRADE SLOWDOWN: A NEW NORMAL? 3, 4–5 (Bernard Hoekman ed., 2015) (ebook).
39
INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 63 (2016), https://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/WEO/Issues/2016/12/31/Subdued-Demand-Symptoms-and-Remedies. Csilla
Lakatos & Franziska Ohnsorge, Arm’s-Length Trade: A Source of Post-Crisis Trade Weakness
1 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 8144, 2017), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
bitstream/handle/10986/27647/WPS8144.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
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2015 (Nairobi Ministerial Conference) respectively, the Doha Round of
multilateral trade negotiations, initiated in 2001 and stalled for years, has been
officially declared dead by the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration issued on
December 19, 2015.40 At the same time, there has been a significant increase
since 1992 in the number of RTAs globally, with over 455 currently in force and
notified to the WTO.41 The United States itself already has fourteen RTAs in
force with a total of twenty countries 42, and there are already eighty-five RTAs
in existence affecting the East Asian region43, with others being negotiated.
The negotiation of the TPP can be seen as the development of a
framework for guiding further economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region,
given the rapid growth of bilateral and regional RTAs that have affected
countries in the region since 2000. From the standpoint of the United States,
TPP was supposed to serve five important goals: first, it represented a “gold
standard” for future trade agreements involving the United States, i.e., it was
designed to cover dimensions such as trade in services and foreign direct
investment (FDI) that are not part of the Doha Round;44 second, TPP has been
seen as paving the way for broader economic integration in the Asia-Pacific
region with the potential of generating much greater economic benefits than a
typical, narrowly-defined RTA;45 third, TPP could have provided a model for
taming the Asia-Pacific “noodle bowl” of overlapping RTAs in the region,
where complex rules of origin (ROOs) can result in economic inefficiency;46
40

See World Trade Organization, Nairobi Ministerial Declaration of 19 December 2015, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(15)/DEC (noting that while some members wished to pursue the Doha
Development Agenda, other members disagreed and sought “new approaches” for negotiations).
41
Facts and Figures, Subsection to Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm#facts [https://perma.cc/X62A-CW39].
42
See Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements (listing the countries with which the U.S. has free trade
agreements, which includes 12 bilateral treaties and 2 multilateral agreements) (last visited
October 1, 2018). See also Facts and Figures, supra note 41.
43
Physical RTAs in Force, Participation by Region, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://rtais.wto.
org/UI/Charts.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
44
Peter A. Petri et al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A
Quantitative Assessment 6 (East-West Ctr. Working Papers, Econ. Series, Working Paper
No. 119, 2011), https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/trans-pacific-partnership-andasia-pacific-integration-quantitative-assessment [https://perma.cc/754B-QULY] (summarizing the distinguishing features of the TPP).
45
Id.
46
See id. at 6; see also Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 8 (discussing the benefits of the
TPP to the United States, which includes increased efficiency in labor and capital markets).
ROOs are designed to ensure that only goods primarily produced within an RTA are eligible
for tariff preferences, therefore, a single set of ROOs would allow intermediate inputs
produced in any TPP country to count towards meeting ROO standards. Id. at 8 n.10.
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fourth, the United States would have got preferential access to some Asian
markets covered by existing RTAs such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), which it is currently not a member;47 and fifth, TPP would
have created important new constraints on China in international trade well
beyond what currently exists under the WTO.48
B. Regionalism and the Rise of “Deep Integration”
The pace of multilateral trade negotiations has slowed significantly
since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, and the subsequent
formation of the WTO. The latest round of WTO negotiations, known as the
Doha Development Round, begun in 2001, were in deadlock for years before
their official termination in 2015.49 Parallel to these negotiations, many WTO
members and non-members have either negotiated or are in the process of
negotiating RTAs.50 This shift in focus to regional trade liberalization has been
driven by several factors. First, the world economy has become multi-polar,
moving from one dominated by a “membership restricted to the willing” (the
United States, EU, Japan, and Canada — collectively known as “the Quad”)
able to promote multilateralism within the GATT/WTO,51 to one where
emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
(BRICS) are now more able to influence and re-arrange the global trading
47

See Petri et al, supra note 44, at 6 (explaining that the TPP would help “level the playing
field for U.S. exports to Asian markets” due to the exclusion of the U.S. from ASEAN).
48
See id. at 7 (noting the analyses of the intent behind the TPP, with some considering the
agreement an attempt to isolate or control China within the Asia Pacific region).
49
See Shawn Donnan, World Trade Organisation Moves On from Stalled Doha Round, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/08968f4e-a682-11e5-9700-2b669a5aeb83
(describing the “deep-seated differences” leading to the end of the Doha Round of negotiations
initiated in 2001); Editorial, Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/global-trade-after-the-failure-ofthe-doha-round.html [https://perma.cc/RLJ3-6SDP] (opining on the termination of the Doha
talks after 14 years of “fruitless” negotiations).
50
See Facts and Figures, supra note 41 (noting the rise in RTAs which includes a “notable
increase in large plurilateral agreements under negotiation”).
51
See Paul Collier, Why the WTO is Dead-locked: And What Can Be Done About It?, 29
WORLD ECON. 1423, 1425 (2006) (describing how the GATT was a means for “OECD
countries to strike deals for reciprocal trade liberalisation,” but with the few participating
developing countries marginalized in such agreements); see also Richard Baldwin, The World
Trade Organization and the Future of Multilateralism, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 106 (2016)
(describing how the GATT period was dominated by “the Quad” who held two-third of world
imports and directed negotiations for trade agreements).
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system.52 Second, trade linkages have become much more complex with
disintegration of the vertical production chain and the associated increase in
offshoring of production of intermediates by developed to developing
countries.53 Third, most orthodox trade barriers have already been eliminated
through eight successive rounds of the GATT, such that average ad valorem
manufacturing tariffs have reached historic lows, at less than 4%.54
In this context, there are a number of reasons for why the WTO has
made little progress towards further multilateral trade liberalization since the
Doha Round began in 2001.55 First, during the lifetime of GATT, the Quad
dominated global trade, accounting for two-thirds of imports, whereas now they
account for half of world imports.56 The rapid growth of emerging economies
and their accession to the WTO have probably reduced the Quad’s ability to push
for increased market access. Second, the rapid growth of RTAs and associated
tariff-cutting that might otherwise have been completed under the WTO has
resulted in member countries using up domestic political capital, thereby making
completion of the Doha Round more difficult.57 Third, many of the more recent
RTAs have incorporated what are termed “deep” provisions that go well beyond
tariff-cutting, instead focusing on restricting the use of explicitly “national” rules
on investment, and intellectual property protection.58 In addition, there has been
a significant expansion in bilateral investment treaties, where countries concede
national sovereignty in order to encourage inbound FDI.59 The combination of
deep RTA provisions and investment treaties suggests that many countries want
to place disciplines on economic activities that were never included in the terms
52

See Baldwin, supra note 51, at 106 (noting how the increased membership of developing
countries to the WTO led to a shift in power resulting in more difficult trade negotiations
and increased participation in defensive coalitions by developing countries).
53
See id. at 108 (discussing the difficulties in reach a consensus on multilateral trade
agreements after developing countries dropped tariffs to increase offshore industrialization).
54
See id. at 98–101 (providing an analysis of lowering effective tariff rates among low-income
and high-income countries, including within the United States, throughout the lifespan of the
GATT).
55
See id. at 106–111 (summarizing the internal and external forces impeding the formation
of multilateral trade agreements).
56
Id. at 106. See also Gordon H. Hanson, The Rise of Middle Kingdoms: Emerging
Economies in Global Trade, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 42 (2012) (discussing shifts in
international trade from dominant trade flows between high-income countries to an increased
share in trade involving developing countries).
57
See Baldwin, supra note 49, at 107 (noting how the rise in regionalism and difficulty in negotiating WTO trade agreements complicated attempts at reaching multilateral trade agreements).
58
See id. at 107 (stating that these “deep” RTAs “went beyond tariff-cutting and included
legally binding assurances aimed at making signatories more business-friendly to trade and
investment flows from other signatories”).
59
Id. at 107–8.

Vol. 4:1]

United States Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership

49

of reference of the WTO.60 Fourth, despite the lack of any substantive progress
in the Doha Round, the rise of offshoring has resulted in unilateral cutting of
tariffs by developing countries seeking to become part of international
production networks, and as a consequence, developed countries are now less
interested in multilateral trade talks.61
C. Deep vs. Shallow Integration
There is an important qualitative difference between the “shallow”
integration of the GATT/WTO, characterized by tariff-cutting, and the “deep”
integration typically found in RTAs. The GATT/WTO was designed to prevent
countries from using tariffs to improve their own terms-of-trade at the expense
of their trade partners.62 If a country is “large,” it can use import tariffs to lower
the world price of its imports relative to the world price of its exports, and
extract surplus from its trade partners. The GATT/WTO contains provisions
that curb member states’ appetites for tariffs beyond what is politically optimal
by promoting reciprocal exchange of market access granted in a nondiscriminatory way to all other GATT/WTO members.63
Mutual exchange of market access was the appropriate focus of trade
negotiations in the “made-there-sold-here” economy.64 More recently, technological advances have allowed firms to “offshore” production processes that
used to be contained within a single, domestic firm.65 In 2015, intra-firm trade
accounted for about one third of global exports,66 and a little less than half of
all U.S. trade is intra-firm, or between a parent company and its affiliates
60

See id. at 108 (noting that these agreements did not directly compete with the WTO, but
provided evidence that participating nations sought agreements that “went far beyond the
‘shallow’ disciplines included in WTO talks”).
61
See id. at 108 (discussing how developing countries opted to reduce tariffs to increase
industrialization by joining international production networks, which reduced incentives to
engage in multilateral talks).
62
Kyle Bagwell et al., Is the WTO Passé?, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 11–25, 1126–27 (2016) (discussing
how the GATT “facilitated gradual, multilateral trade liberalization and allowed countries to sustain an extensive period of low most-favored-nation tariffs” with binding, reciprocal agreements).
63
See id. at 1154–61 (analyzing GATT/WTO negotiations and their rules and provisions, which
reflect a “norm of reciprocity” and incorporate a nondiscrimination principle embodied in the
most-favored-nation rules).
64
See Baldwin, supra note 51, at 96 (“[T]he rules and procedures of the WTO were designed
for a global economy in which made-here-sold-there goods moved across national borders.”).
65
See Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, Global Sourcing, 112, J. POL. ECON., 552, 553–55
(2004) (discussing integrated and disintegrated firms in light of specialization and foreign
outsourcing trends).
66
Lakatos & Ohnsorge, supra note 38, at 1.
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abroad.67 International commerce is increasingly characterized by flows of
investment and know-how from developed to developing countries in
exchange for low-cost intermediate goods.68 However, a firm’s ability to
offshore production depends on the quality of governance in those foreign
countries.69 Multinational companies (MNCs) and their affiliates are interested
in harmonizing economic policy across countries and ensuring that their
interests will be protected abroad.70 This has increased the “demand” for deep
integration among firms in both the developed and developing world.71
The GATT and its successor the WTO was and is not an appropriate
mechanism for “deep integration” that goes beyond the reduction of tariffs. The
GATT/WTO has been concerned primarily with reducing barriers to the trade in
goods. The most commonly used trade barrier is tariffs; thus, the focus of the
GATT/WTO throughout most of its existence has been tariff reductions with
great success; today’s tariff rates are very low by comparison to historical rates
from the early twentieth century.72 Other barriers pertaining to goods covered by
67

See id. at 6–7 (noting from 2002 to 2014 the United States’s share of intra-firm exports in total
U.S. exports was about 30% and the share of intra-firm exports in total U.S. imports was 50%).
68
See Jonathan Haskel et al., Globalization and U.S. Wages: Modifying Classic Theory to
Explain Recent Facts, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 121 (2012) (describing a surge in international
trade with the U.S. increasingly importing intermediates and final products from low- and
middle-income countries); see also Marcel P. Timmer et al., Slicing Up Global Value Chains,
28 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 100, 116 (2014) (concluding that global fragmentation of production
has rapidly increased resulting in “mature economies relocat[ing] their unskilled-laborintensive production activities to lower-wage countries, while keeping strategic and highvalue-added functions concentrated at home”).
69
See Alberto Osnago et al., Deep Trade Agreements and Vertical FDI: The Devil Is in the
Details 3–4 (World Bank Grp., Working Paper No. 7464, 2015) (elucidating how
“contractual frictions are pervasive in international transactions because of differences in
legal systems, poor institutional quality in certain countries involved in one end of the
transaction and limited enforcement ability”).
70
Soo Yeon Kim, Deep Integration and Regional Trade Agreements, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 360–61 (Lisa L. Martin ed.,
2015), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199981755.001.0001/ox
fordhb-9780199981755-e-25 (stating that “trade and production costs generated by
incompatibilities in trade-related domestic regulations across countries now figure more
prominently in the strategies of multinational firms” and such firms “are the key promoters of
making national regulatory systems compatible, as this helps to reduce the cost of doing business
abroad and generally improves the operation of the international supply chain”).
71
See Baldwin, supra note 51, at 111 (discussing how the rise in offshoring has led to more deep
regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties where the WTO was unable to address
issues affecting international production networks).
72
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 200 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW] (noting that WTO member countries have agreed to bind 99
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the GATT/WTO are quotas, i.e., numerical restrictions imposed on imports,73
anti-dumping duties imposed on imports sold at below cost or predatory prices
to gain a foothold on the internal market,74 and subsidies, which are governmentprovided funds that reduce the cost of production of an exporter, and which gives
exporters a competitive advantage.75 All of these barriers are directly related to
the trade in goods and are subject to discipline under the GATT/WTO and its
related agreements. The concerns of MNCs about governance and economic
policy, including issues relating to environmental regulation and labor and
working conditions, are beyond the scope of the GATT and other WTO
agreements. To achieve deep integration on these matters of economic policy,
countries had to negotiate agreements containing these provisions outside of the
WTO in the form of RTAs or bilateral trade agreements.76
percent of tariffs for developed countries, 73 percent for developing countries, and 98 percent
for economies in transition, which differs significantly from historical rates).
73
Id. at 265.
74
See id. at 469 (discussing how “the exporter may use its artificially low-priced exports to drive
domestic competitors in the export market out of business, or to discourage the development of a
domestic competitor in the export market[, and] [o]nce this occurs, the exporter can raise its prices
or lower the quality of its products[,]” thereby causing harm to the import market’s consumers).
75
See id. at 518 (defining “subsidy” and explaining that export subsidies may result in
exporters engaging in predatory pricing through artificially depressed prices).
76
The compatibility of free trade areas and the GATT/WTO needs some explanation. Under
GATT Article III, the Most Favored Nation (MFN) Principle, all WTO members have an
obligation to extend any trade benefits given to one WTO member to all other members. See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
(requiring all signatories to reciprocate internal taxation and regulation exemptions and apply
such trade provisions similarly among all signatories). Under MFN, free trade areas would be
impossible because members of the free trade area would have to extend zero tariffs to all other
WTO members, which would completely undermine the purpose of having a free trade area, i.e.
to provide zero tariffs only to members of the free trade area. GATT Article XXIV creates an
exception to the MFN Principle for free trade areas. Id. at art. XXIV (providing exceptions for
“customs unions” between member countries). GATT Article XXIV explicitly recognizes free
trade areas as consistent with the GATT/WTO so long as they do not reduce trade between
members of the free trade area with non-members below levels that would have existed in the
absence of the free trade area. Id. In other words, free trade areas are permitted so long as they do
not result in trade diversion from non-members of the free trade area. Members of free trade areas
are required to first obtain authorization from the GATT/WTO before setting up a free trade area.
Id. As a practical matter, countries have first established free trade areas and then seek approval.
Of course, a rejection of a free trade area by the GATT/WTO would require the undoing of an
existing free trade area created after many years of negotiations with sunk political costs. For this
reason, no free trade area has even been challenged or found invalid due to trade diversion effects.
For a further discussion of how preferential trade areas in goods, services, and intellectual
property are compatible with MFN, see CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW,
supra note 72, 161–62 (providing a general overview of the GATT exceptions to MFN
obligations and explaining the special exceptions for preferential trade areas).
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One early example of deep integration was the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), negotiated by the United Sates, Canada, and
Mexico. NAFTA lowered tariffs, but it is important to note that all the signatories
to NAFTA were also signatories to the GATT77. Although bound tariff rates were
fairly high for Mexico under GATT, the United States and Canada were members
of the Quad, and had already cut tariffs significantly. Perhaps more important
were the behind-the-border changes; NAFTA required reforms to domestic laws
governing market access, competition policy, state owned enterprises (SOEs),
and regulation of monopolies.78 NAFTA also greatly strengthened protections for
intellectual property and foreign investment.79 These reforms required under
NAFTA would not have been possible under the WTO.
NAFTA illustrates some important features of modern RTAs. First,
although RTAs frequently include tariff reductions, their effects on tariffs
globally has been modest. Despite the recent explosion of RTAs, 84% of global
merchandise trade (excluding intra-EU trade) still takes place at GATT/WTOnegotiated tariff rates.80 Second, RTAs tend to cover a wide range of issues. The
literature distinguishes between “WTO-plus” provisions, which simply extend
commitments already covered under the WTO, and “WTO-extra” provisions,
which deal with issues not covered by WTO agreements.81 RTAs can have
dozens of “WTO-extra” provisions.82 An exhaustive list is beyond the scope of
this article, but they typically include provisions governing competition policy,
foreign investment, intellectual property issues beyond those covered in the
WTO, and labor and environmental standards.83 As the prevalence of offshoring
grows, harmonizing domestic policy will only become more important.
77

See The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 1994, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm [https://perma.cc/DMF6-2M8K] (last visited Nov. 11,
2018) (providing the GATT was signed by Canada in 1948 and Mexico in 1986).
78
See North American Free Trade Agreement, arts. 1501, 1502, Sept. 6, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605.
79
See generally Kent S. Foster & Dean C. Alexander, Opportunities for Mexico, Canada
and the United States: A Summary of Intellectual Property Rights Under the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 67, 71 (1994) (noting that
NAFTA will protect IP via enforcement procedures, dispute settlement and the reduction of
compulsory licenses, and will protect investment from discriminatory treatment).
80
Bagwell et al., supra note 62, at 1137.
81
See e.g., Henrik Horn et al., Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential
Trade Agreements, 33 WORLD ECONOMY 1565, 1567 (2010) (explaining the difference
between WTO-plus and WTO-extra provisions).
82
See Henrik Horn et al., Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements, 33 WORLD ECON., 1565, 1568 (2010) (analyzing trade agreements involving the European
Community or the U.S. and noting that both sets of agreements contain WTO-plus and WTO-extra
terms, but European Community agreements use four times more WTO-extra provisions).
83
See, e.g., id., at 1571-2 (2010) (listing examples of WTO-extra provisions).
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D. Deep Integration and TPP
TPP committed signatories to eliminate many tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade with other members.84 This included a commitment to eliminate
tariffs on manufactured goods and greatly reduce protection for agricultural
goods.85 Tariff cuts would have been phased in at different rates for different
products, but 95% of tariff lines would eventually have been cut to zero,86
resulting in free trade for the vast majority of goods. These proposed tariff cuts
were part of the “WTO-extra” commitments included in TPP – meaning they
extended commitments already made under the GATT/WTO. In other words,
these tariff cuts resulting in free trade would be available for the members of
TPP trading within the RTA but would not be available for non-members when
they trade with members of TPP. Members of TPP would be entitled to treatment
more favorable than that available to non-TPP members under an exception to
the Most Favored Nation (MFN) Principle of the WTO.87 While the tariff cuts
appear to offer significant increases in market access, many of the signatories to
TPP have existing RTAs with each other. The net effect on actual applied tariffs
would have been moderate.88 The projected economic benefits of TPP were
more the result of the “deep integration” provisions contained in the agreement.
Besides cutting tariffs, the agreement also strengthened WTO disciplines
around Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Measures dealing with food safety,89
government procurement,90 as well as customs and trade facilitation.91 It also
added new protections for intellectual property, beyond what was negotiated in
the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
84

See FERGUSSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 15 (“TPP would eventually eliminate all
industrial goods tariffs and most agriculture tariffs and quotas.”).
85
See id. at 4.
86
See id. at 15, 18 (noting how the commitments phase in over time so that “[e]ventually
95% or more tariff lines in each country would be duty-free”).
87
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 161–62
(discussing the use of customs unions and free trade areas as exceptions to the MFN principle).
88
Chad P. Bown, Mega-Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO, 8 GLOBAL
POL’Y 107, 108 (2017).
89
TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 7. SPS measures are governed by the WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which is concerned with food safety. See
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 493, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (laying out obligations
of signatories to take steps “necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health”).
90
See TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 15.
91
Id. at ch. 5.
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agreement.92 This included additional protections for patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and trade secrets93. Importantly, TPP required strong domestic
enforcement of intellectual property (IP) protections, including criminal
penalties for offenders, again beyond what is required under TRIPS.94 Similarly,
TPP strengthened protections for international trade in services beyond the
WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).95 TPP also prohibited
members from imposing any quantitative restrictions on international trade in
services or requiring foreign-service providers to establish a local affiliate.96
TPP also included a chapter on investment that went well beyond those
commitments contained within the WTO Trade Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS) agreement.97 This chapter enshrines many of the provisions contained
in the model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) used by the State Department as a template for all future U.S. BITs.98 Especially important were guarantees for the free transfer of funds across borders (subject to some nondiscriminatory safeguard measures) and prohibitions on so called “performance
requirements” such as technology transfers.99 Investors would also have had the
right to seek binding international arbitration against host governments that
violate TPP’s investment provisions.100
TPP’s other “WTO-extra” provisions covered a range of issues outside
the scope of current GATT/WTO agreements, although some already exist in
other RTAs. For example, TPP introduced new rules focused on e-commerce
and telecommunications.101 TPP prohibited members from blocking or imposing
92

See FERGUSSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 8.
See id. at 10
94
See Kimberly Weatherall, Intellectual Property in the TPP: Not ‘The New TRIPS’,
Melbourne J. Int’l L. 1, 8 (2017) (“[TPP] requires IP protection that significantly exceeds
the standards established in TRIPS: copyright and patent rights must last longer; patents (and
trade marks) must cover a broader range of subject matters; additional tools of enforcement
must be provided, including very broad criminalization.”).
95
For example, while GATS includes legal service under its ambit, they are not as detailed as the
TPP’s or as effective in allowing for transnational legal practice. Compare General Agreement
on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final
_e.htm, with TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 10, Annex 10-A.
96
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 10.5, 10.6.
97
See FERGUSSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 56 (reviewing TPP provisions on investments that went “significantly beyond WTO agreements”).
98
See id. (noting that the TPP mostly incorporates the 2012 Model BIT’s core investor
protections and exceptions, as well as some provisions that went “somewhat beyond” the
model BIT).
99
See id. at 54, 57 (pointing to standard protections in the TPP that comport or exceed BIT).
100
See id. at 54.
101
Id. at 35, 66.
93
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duties on the transmission of data, or requiring firms from TPP member states to
build local data centers or transfer source code.102 TPP members were also
required to ensure that firms have access to domestic telecommunications
infrastructure “on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions,” and
any licensing processes are transparent and non-discriminatory.103
E. “WTO-Extra” Provisions Directed at China
The United States included, starting in 2008, several key provisions in
TPP that were general in application but specifically directed at China. In a 2016
article, “The TPP Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade,”
President Obama stated:
[The TPP] would give us a leg up on our economic competitors,
including . . . China. Of course, China’s greatest economic opportunities
also lie in its own neighborhood, which is why China is not wasting any
time. As we speak, China is negotiating a trade deal that would carve up
some of the fastest growing markets in the world at our expense, putting
American jobs, businesses and goods at risk. . . . America should write
the rules. America should call the shots. Other countries should play by
the rules that America and our partners set, and not the other way around.
. . . The United States, not . . . China, should write them.104
Obama’s statement also reflects the U.S. strategic interest in having TPP
establish the rules for trade in the Asia region before China could do so through
a rival agreement. As we shall see in the discussion below, the U.S. and China
have starkly contrasting views on standards of international business and trade.
1. Environmental Obligations
The WTO agreements are largely silent on environmental obligations.105
TPP sets forth “WTO-extra” enviromental obligations in Article 20 as follows:
102

TPP, supra note 1, at arts. 14.3, 14.13.
TPP, supra note 1, at arts. 13.4, 13.22.
104
Barack Obama, President Obama: The TPP Would Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on
Global Trade, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/pres
ident-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/68
0540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html?utm_term=.518fb2cfe6d9 [https://perma.cc/
YW32-TQUT].
105
The issue of environmental obligations has a long and tortuous history in the WTO. After
several decades of indecision, it was finally established that environmental protection
103
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1. The Parties recognize that the emissions of certain substances
can significantly deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer
in a manner that is likely to result in adverse effects on human
health and the enviroment. Accordingly, each Party shall take
measure to control the production and consumption of, and trade
in, such substances.106
This provision was aimed squarely at China, the world’s largest
producer of pollutants that damage the earth’s ozone layer.107 Although China
already produces more carbon from fossil fuels than the U.S. and EU
combined, China is continuing to increase its use of “dirty fuels” such as coalfired power plants that damage the earth’s atmosphere.108 While “dirty fuels”
are environmentally harmful, they are much cheaper than environmentally
sustainable alternatives such as gas, solar and wind power commonly used
in the United States.109 The crux of the U.S. concern about China’s use of
“dirty fuels” was that it was not only harming the environment but was also
giving China a competitive advantage in the form of lower manufacturing
concerns could be asserted through GATT Article XX, the general exceptions clause, as a
limit on the trade in goods. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra
note 72, at 321–23, 334–37 (giving an overview of the previous WTO rejections of efforts
to adopt strict trade standards based on environmental protection objectives, but explaining
that subsequent WTO decisions have interpreted the general exceptions clause as authorizing
more flexibility in targeting environmental harms through trade agreements). As the basis of
an exception under Article XX, environmental protection concerns have only a narrow
application within the GATT/WTO. Unlike the TPP, no provision in any of the WTO
agreements creates affirmative environmental obligations. Id. at 321–23 (citation omitted)
(detailing how prior GATT panel decisions concluded that “unilateral measures to force
other countries to change conservation policies cannot satisfy the ‘primarily aimed at’
standard” under the general exceptions clause).
106
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.5.
107
See Chow, Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 27, at 394 (“China poses the world's
single greatest threat to the destruction of the ozone layer, and the key objective of TPP
Article 20.5 is the protection of the ozone layer.”).
108
See Keith Bradsher & Lisa Friedman, China’s Emissions: More Than U.S. Plus Europe,
and Still Rising, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/business/
china-davos-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/3W4P-TNYQ] (stating that China’s
increase in electricity use last year was met by burning more coal).
109
But see Dominic Dudley, Renewable Energy Will Be Consistently Cheaper Than Fossil
Fuels By 2020, Report Claims, FORBES, Jan. 13, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
dominicdudley/2018/01/13/renewable-energy-cost-effective-fossil-fuels2020/#21d068014ff2 [https://perma.cc/X8SZ-5799] (“[A]ll renewable energy technologies
should be competitive on price with fossil fuels by 2020.”).
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costs.110 TPP Article 20.5 would provide the legal basis for the United States
to require China to use alternative fuels and erode China’s cost advantages.
2. Workers’ Rights
As in the case of environmental obligations, the WTO is silent on
issues of labor and workers’ rights. By contrast, TPP Article 19.3(1) provides:
Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and
regulations, and practices thereunder, the following rights as
stated in the ILO [International Labor Organization] Declaration:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour and . . . a prohibition on
eethe worst forms of child labour; and
(d) the climination of discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation.111
China is often criticized by the United States for subjecting workers to
dangerous and unsanitary working conditions, long hours, and permitting what is
tantamount to slave and forced labor.112 Apart from humanitarian concerns, the
United States is concerned that China’s disregard of workers’ rights creates low
labor costs that are a signficant competitive advantage over the United States. For
example, the average cost of manufacturing labor in China is $2.62 per hour while
110

Id.
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 19.3(1).
112
See, e.g., Alwyn Scott, Foxconn Says Investigating Labor Conditions at China Factory Used
For Amazon, REUTERS (June 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-chinalabor/foxconn-says-investigating-labor-conditions-at-china-factory-used-for-amazon-idUSKB
N1J610V [https://perma.cc/A8F4-XK35] (reporting that companies such as Amazon were
investigated by Chinese watchdog groups and cited with “excessive hours, low wages,
inadequate training and an overreliance on ‘dispatch’ or temporary workers in violation of
Chinese law”). See also Jane Perlez, U.S. Report Harshly Criticizes China for Deterioration
of Human Rights; Russia Also Faulted, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), https://www.ny
times.com/2000/02/26/world/us-report-harshly-criticizes-china-for-detoriation-human-rightsrussia-also.html [https://perma.cc/UJJ8-RETG] (recounting the U.S. State Department’s
2000 annual report on human rights, in which China was greeted with “tough language”
regarding their “widespread and well-documented human rights abuses in violation of
internationally accepted norms”).
111
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the average cost in the United States is $35.53 per hour.113 TPP was designed to
address these concerns. The ILO standards referenced in Article 19.3 are
unenforceable outside of TPP as the ILO is a toothless organization without any
enforcement powers.114 By incorporating the standards of the ILO, TPP has
created labor standards enforceable under its dispute settlement mechanism.
In addition, TPP Article 19.5(1) states: “No Party shall fail to
effectively enforce its labour laws through a sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or investment between the
Parties after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”115 Like many
countries, China has extensive labor laws on the books but does not actively
or regularly enforce these laws due to systemic problems such as official
corruption or indifference.116
113

Internationally comparable data on workplace compensation is hard to find for China. For
the hourly manufacturing wage for the United States in 2011, see BUREAU LABOR
STATISTICS, USDL-12-2460, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HOURLY COMPENSATION
COSTS IN MANUFACTURING, 2011 (2012), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ichcc.toc.htm
[https://perma.cc/L8BX-AC82] (stating that the U.S. manufacturing hourly compensation
costs in 2011 was $35.53). For manufacturing hourly wages in China in 2011, see
Manufacturing Hourly Compensation Costs in China and India, CONFERENCE BOARD
(2018), https://www.conference-board.org/ilcprogram/index.cfm?id=38270 [https://perma.
cc/G2W5-GR9Y] (reporting that China’s hourly wage in 2011 was $2.62). However, China
has generally been experiencing increases in hourly wages. In 2016, Chinese manufacturing
labor hit $3.60. ‘Made in China’ Isn’t So Cheap Anymore, and That Could Spell Headache
for Beijing, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2017, 12:37 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/chinesewages-rise-made-in-china-isnt-so-cheap-anymore.html [https://perma.cc/R5W7-U42L]. This
force of rising labor costs could cause factories to flee for other countries and/or invest in
capital equipment. See Pan Kwak Yuk, Want Cheap Labour? Head to Mexico, not China,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/bddc8121-a7a0-3788-a74c-cd2b49
cd3230 (reporting that Mexico, with lower hourly wages that China, might be used as an
alternative source for cheap labor).
114
See Anthony Freeman, ILO Labor Standards and U.S. Compliance, 3 PERSP. WORK 28,
29 (1999) (discussing how the ILO is a voluntary organization which that has no enforcement
powers other than “condemnatory language”). See also Neil Gough, The Workers Who
Regret Trump’s Scrapping of a Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/03/01/business/trump-tpp-trade-vietnam-labor-environment.html [https://per
ma.cc/E44K-G3YJ] (discussing how agreements like the TPP give teeth to labor
protections).
115
TPP, supra note 1, at Art. 19.5(1).
116
See Kinglun Ngok, The Changes of Chinese Labor Policy and Labor Legislation in the
Context of Market Transition, 73 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 45, 55 (2008)
(pointing to weak local government oversight of factories and lack of strong enforcement
laws for violations of labor contracts as reasons for why the Chinese labor contract system
functions poorly). See also China’s Labour Law Is No Use to Those Who Need it Most,
ECONOMIST (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.economist.com/china/2017/08/17/chinas-labourlaw-is-no-use-to-those-who-need-it-most [https://perma.cc/MWB5-8RXQ] (arguing that
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Due to these systemic weaknesses, any attempt to use China’s legal
system to enforce labor laws will be difficult, if not futile. Under TPP,
China’s enforcement of its own labor laws becomes a TPP obligation and
enforceable through the TPP dispute settlement system. These two provisions
(along with others) are designed to raise the level of protections for workers
in China and level the playing field by raising labor cost, a key input in
manufacturing. From the perspective of the United States, raising labor cost
is important because this measure erodes one of China’s major advantages in
international trade.
3. State-Owned Enterprises
One of the most contentious issues between the U.S. and China concerns
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).117 The U.S. believes that the Chinese
government engages in unfair trade and business practices by providing various
forms of financial and regulatory assistance to its SOEs at the expense of
multinational companies.118 An SOE is a business entity that is an administrative
unit of the State and is owned by the State as opposed to any private person or
group of persons.119
recent labor laws have not protected the Chinese workforce); Geoffrey Crothall, Opinion,
Refusing to Honor Labor Rights Backfires on China, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/opinion/refusing-to-honor-labor-rights-backfires-on-china.html
[https://perma.cc/Z2XY-XLTD] (discussing how China’s lack of labor law enforcement has
led to large-scale unrest among workers).
117
See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO
COMPLIANCE 75–78 (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%20
2017%20WTO%20Report.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON CHINA] (discussing the importance of state-controlled entities in China and
the United States’s unsuccessful attempts at accessing information on these entities by
enforcing WTO notification requirements); Zhenhua Lu, US Urged to Block China’s State
Companies from Buying High Security Risk American Assets, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Nov. 16, 2017, 8:28 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120
122/us-urged-block-chinas-state-companies-buying-high [https://perma.cc/2AGH-M48A] (reporting that the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended “that
Congress consider updating legislation pertaining to national security reviews of foreign
investment to address ‘current and evolving security risks’” stemming from SOEs in China).
118
See Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises at the Expense
of Multinational Companies in China and Other Countries, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L. 455, 455–56
(2016) (stating that China “uses a set of policies that seem designed to promote its own stateowned enterprises . . . at the expense of foreign multinational companies . . . doing business
in China and in other countries”).
119
Id. at 466.
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China views SOEs as “the lifeline of the economy”120 and has
vowed to incessantly strengthen their vitality.121 China has a web of
policies seeking to promote SOEs as “national champions”122 capable of
competing with or surpassing the world’s most powerful multinational
companies.123 A key point of contention is the United States’ position that
China systematically provides subsidies or finanical asistance to SOEs in
the form of direct grants or as well as indirect transfers through
intermediate entities indirect transfers.124 China’s state provided financial
and non-financial assistance to SOEs allows them to operate at lower costs,
allowing them to enjoy a competitive advantage both within China and in
the international realm.
TPP Article 17.6 prohibits any “non-commercial assistance,”
including susidies, to any SOE relating to the production of goods or the
supply of services.125 Under Article 17.6 “non-commercial assistance” refers
to assitance that is not available in the marketplace and is provided by a
government.126 Specifically, assistance to SOEs refers to:
(i) direct transfers of funds or potential direct transfer of funds or
liabilities, such as:
A. grants or debt forgiveness;
B. loans, loan gurantees or other types of financing on terms
more favourable than those commercially available to that
enterprise; or
120

See Ian Johnson & Keith Bradsher, On Way Out, China’s Leader Offers Praise for the
Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/asia/
hu-jintao-exiting-communist-leader-cautions-china.html [https://perma.cc/8TCR-Z8HX] (quoting Hu Jintao, former general secretary of the Communist Party in China, from his address
to the 18th Party Congress before stepping down).
121
See China State Arms Maker Pledges ‘Mixed Ownership’ Reforms, REUTERS (Jan. 5,
2017, 6:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-norinco/china-state-arms-makerpledges-mixed-ownershipreforms-idUSKBN14P165 [https://perma.cc/CMB9-FZ5S] (discussing China’s ambitious reform plans to strengthen and make more competitive SOEs).
122
See KJELD ERIK BRØDSGAARD & KOEN RUTTEN, FROM ACCELERATED ACCUMULATION
TO SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY IN CHINA 156, 161–62, 164 (2017), https://www.
jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h2tj.11 (discussing the Chinese government’s strategies and
reforms to its SOEs to compete with multinational corporations).
123
See id. at 156, 161–62 (explaining how China’s policies are intended “to strengthen the
international competitiveness of” its SOEs).
124
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA, supra note 117,
at 6–7, 12–13, 75.
125
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 17.6.
126
Id. at art. 17.1.
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C. equity capital inconsistent with the usual investment
practice, including for the provision of risk capital, of
private investors; or
(ii) goods or services other than general infrastructure on terms
more favourable than those commerical available to that
enterprise . . . .127
The WTO also disciplines the use of subsidies under the GATT and the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Meaures (SCM),128 but the
WTO deals with subsidies in general while TPP deals specifically with subsidies
provided to SOEs. TPP’s broad definition of a subsidy is crucial because a
breach of this obligation allows the United States to impose sanctions in the form
of countervailing duties, i.e., an additional tariff, to offset the financial effect of
the subsidy. In other words, TPP would give the United States a stronger legal
justification for the imposition of countervailing duties on China’s SOEs than
that currently available under the WTO. The availability of this option under
TPP would allow the United States to have a stronger case for imposing trade
sanctions on China to offset the effect of subsidies given to SOEs and erode one
of China’s major advantages in international trade.
4. Technology Transfer
The Trump Administration has repeatedly voiced vehement objections
to China’s alleged practices that force U.S. companies to tranfer their
technology.129 In a Presidential Memorandum issued on March 22, 2018,
President Trump declared:
China uses foreign ownership restrictions, including joint
venture requirements, equity limitations, and other investment
restrictions, to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S.
companies to Chinese entities. China also uses administrative
127

Id. at Art. 17.1.
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter SCM].
129
See Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section
301 Investigation of China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,099, 13,099–100 (Mar. 22,
2018) (listing grievances against China for coercive trade practices as support for directing
the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate issuance of retaliatory tariffs).
128
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review and licensing procedures to require or pressure
technology transfer, which, inter alia, undermines the value of
U.S. investments and technology and weakens the global
competitiveness of U.S. firms.130
The concerns expressed by the Trump Administration typically arise
in the following context. An MNC with its headquarters in the U.S. seeks to
establish a wholly owned business entity in China in order to manufacture
products or provide services for the Chinese and international markets. Due
to China’s legal restrictions on foreign investment, the MNC is not permitted
to establish a wholly owned business entity in the particular industry, such as
telecommunications.131 Rather, foreign investment in the industry is
permitted only in the form of a joint venture, a business entity that is jointly
owned by the MNC and a Chinese company. As the WTO does not cover
investment, except tangentially,132 and the United States and China do not
have a BIT, China is free to set any restrictions on foreign investment
consistent with its own internal legal requirements. China is free to require
that the MNC partner with a local Chinese enterprise, such as an SOE. If the
MNC decides to go ahead with the joint venture, it will be required to obtain
various regulatory approvals by Chinese authorities. When the MNC applies
for approval, Chinese authorities require or pressure the MNC at the approval
stage or later in an administrative review or licensing stage to transfer
technology to the joint venture.133 The reasoning by the Chinese authorities
130

Id. at 13,099.
China classifies proposals for joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned entities into four
categories depending on the industry: encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited under
the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalog first promulgated in 1997 and updated
versions in 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2017. NAT. DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N & MINISTRY OF
COMMERCE OF CHINA, CATALOGUE OF INDUSTRIES FOR GUIDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
(REVISION 2017), INVEST IN CHINA (July 28, 2017) http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121
_39_4851_0_7.html [https://perma.cc/6FKK-5SZ2].
132
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 397-99 (3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS] (explaining how the
WTO treats foreign direct investment).
133
This observation is based on the author’s own experience working in China as in-house
counsel for a multinational company. The author was present at numerous meetings with
Chinese officials during the approval process for the company’s joint ventures and corporate
organizations. These officials regularly asked for advanced technology to be transferred to the
joint venture. The implication was clear that failure to comply with these requests would result
in an impasse or a long delay in the approval process. The author has had discussions with other
attorneys in China who indicate that other multinational companies face the similar demands.
131
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is that the joint venture cannot be successful unless it has access to the U.S.
company’s advanced technology in the form of patents, trademarks,
copyrights, trade secrets, or know-how.134 As the joint venture is a Chinese
company formed under Chinese law, the transfer of technology by the MNC
to the joint venture is a form of technology transfer to a Chinese company.
Moreover, since the Chinese partner is an equity owner of the joint venture,
the Chinese partner, an SOE in our hypothetical, also becomes an owner of
the U.S. sourced technology. Although the MNC is not actually being
“forced” to set up a joint venture in China and submit to this technology
transfer process, the U.S. company cannot have access to the Chinese market
unless it agrees to form a joint venture. U.S. companies claim that this choice
is tantamount to being “forced” to transfer their technology to a Chinese
company or to the Chinese government.
United States concerns about China’s technology transfer practices are
not new to the Trump Administration. Previous United States administrations
recognized that the WTO’s TRIPS agreement, although a landmark agreement,
is silent on the type of technology transfer arrangement that is discussed above
and that is the crux of United States concerns. To close this gap, when the United
States drafted TPP, the United States inserted Article 9.10(1)(f), which provides:
No Party shall, in connection with the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other
disposition of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a nonParty in its territory, impose or enforce any requirement, or
enforce any commitment or undertaking . . . to transfer a
particular technology, a production process or other proprietary
knowledge to a person in its territory . . . .135
By going beyond TRIPS, TPP provided the United States with a legal
basis to challenge China’s scheme to compel U.S. companies to transfer their
technologies as a condition of being allowed to set up a company in China.
II. EXPECTED ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TPP
While the previous part of this article examined the strategic goals of
TPP, this part now turns to the expected economic benefits of TPP. A large
body of academic work supports the view that TPP would create significant
economic benefits for the United States and its other members.
134
135

See id.
TPP, supra note 1, at Art. 9.10(1)(f).
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A. Income Gains
Substantial global economic growth was expected from TPP. Under
TPP, $492 billion would have been added to global GDP by 2030, including
a $131 billion increase (0.5%) in U.S. GDP and a $125 billion (2.5%) in
Japanese GDP.136 There would also have been a significant growth impact
for some of the emerging economies included in TPP.137 For example,
Vietnam and Malaysia were anticipated to experience 8.1% and 7.6%
increases respectively in their GDP, amounting to $41 and $52 billion.138 In
particular, Vietnam, a low labor cost economy, was expected to expand as a
manufacturing hub in industries such as textiles and apparel.139 These
expected gains in GDP reflect benefits from both increased trade as well as
FDI, with a large part of the gains to the United States likely to have come
from trade in services and FDI in the service sector.140
B. Tariff-Cutting
While there is currently a low trade-weighted141 average tariff rate of
2.6% applied by TPP members against other TPP members, there is quite a
bit of variation across TPP members, leaving room for substantial trade
liberalization.142 Average trade-weighted applied tariffs vary from 0.4% in
136

Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 14–15 (citing large projected annual income gains for
Malaysia and Vietnam).
137
See id. (listing the projected benefits for countries such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei,
and Peru).
138
Id. at 14.
139
C.f. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Rules of Origin in Textiles and Apparel, in 1 ASSESSING THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 66, 70, 72–73 (2016),
https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/assessing-trans-pacific-partnership-volume-1-mar
ket-access-and-sectoral (discussing how the TPP could benefit the textile and apparel
industries in Vietnam, and that the size of such benefits depends on whether rules of origin
are eliminated or if FDI would shift from China to Vietnam).
140
See Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 15 (concluding that the TPP would result in
significant increases in exports, and that the U.S. would have been one of the largest recipients
of inward FDI).
141
The average of a country’s tariffs weighted by the value of its imports.
142
Caroline Freund et al., Tariff Liberalization, in Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES
31, 31–33 (2016), https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/assessing-trans-pacificpartnership-volume-1-market-access-and-sectoral (noting that the extent of liberalization
“depends on current applied tariff rates and existing free trade agreements,” and that despite
relatively low tariffs, potential TPP members had varying tariff rates).
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Singapore to 6.2% in Vietnam.143 The United States applies an average tariff
of 1.2% against other TPP members, with its highest applied tariff being 4.4%
against Vietnam.144 In terms of actual tariff-cutting, almost 75% of all tariffs
were scheduled to be removed once the TPP was formally in place, and
eventually , 99% of trade in goods were to be liberalized.145 With respect to
the timeline and specific products, almost all tariffs, including the 350% tariff
on U.S. tobacco and tobacco products would have been zeroed out by year
sixteen of TPP being in force.146 After year sixteen, only U.S. tariffs on
imports of Japanese automobiles and trucks, at 2.5% and 25% respectively,
would have remained in place until year 30 of the agreement.147
C. Trade and Investment Effects
Exports among all TPP countries were projected to grow $1,025
billion by 2030, an increase of 11.5%.148 The lion’s share of export growth
would have been captured by the United States, Japan, Vietnam and
Malaysia, their exports increasing by $357 (9%), $276 (23%), $107 (30%)
and $99 (20%) billion respectively.149 For the United States, export gains
would have occurred in primary goods (agriculture and mining), advanced
manufacturing and service sectors, with increased imports in labor-intensive
sectors such as textiles and apparel.150 At the same time, the potential for
trade diversion, where trade between TPP members displaces trade with nonTPP members, while tangible for countries such as China, India, Korea and
Thailand, would have been small relative to those countries’ GDP.151
By 2030, inbound FDI would have increased $446 billion (3.5%)
compared to an increase in outbound FDI of $305 billion (2%).152 The largest
recipients of inbound FDI were expected to be the United States, Canada,
Japan, and Malaysia; and the largest sources of outbound FDI were expected
to be the United States, Japan, and the EU—inbound FDI exceeding outbound FDI due to the improved investment environment within TPP.153
143

Id. at 33.
Id. at 33.
145
Id. at 31.
146
Id. at 35.
147
Id.
148
Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 15–16.
149
Id. at 16.
150
Id. at 17.
151
Id. at 15.
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Id.
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Id. at 11.
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D. Trade Balance and Employment Effects
In evaluating the macroeconomic effects of TPP, it is important to
recognize that net national savings and overall employment will typically vary
around normal long-run levels once any short-term adjustments have
occurred.154 It is well-understood that an RTA does not affect a country’s trade
balance unless it also affects long-term net national savings.155 This follows from
an identity stating that the difference between national savings and investment is
equal to net exports (imports), i.e., if a country is running a current account
deficit, it has to finance through either selling assets or borrowing from abroad.156
Likewise, an RTA cannot affect long-term employment in an economy
due to market and policy adjustments.157 Overall employment in an economy is
a macroeconomic phenomenon, driven by aggregate demand and supply for
labor.158 If an economy is at full employment, increased trade imports) will likely
result in changes in the composition of jobs, not the number of jobs, and the
central bank will adjust monetary policy accordingly to offset the effects of trade
on the job market.159 If the economy is operating at less than full employment,
the central bank will allow trade expansion (contraction) to persist (loosen
monetary policy).160 Of course, there may be short-run adjustments in the labor
154

See Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economics Of Analyzing The TPP, PETERSON
INST. INT’L ECON. 3–4 (April 12, 2016), https://piie.com/commentary/testimonies/economicsanalyzing-tpp [https://perma.cc/R2QN-D6JA] (noting that the figures for net national savings and
overall employment will return to normal trend values for long-term macroeconomic analyses).
155
See id. at 3 (stating that trade agreements like the TPP will not change trade balances over
time without provisions to change national savings).
156
See C. Fred Bergsten, Trade Balances and the NAFTA Renegotiation, PETERSON INST.
INT’L ECON. 2 (June 2017), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb17-23.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/SZ65-RPFH] (“A shortage of savings generates a net capital inflow that finances a
trade deficit while insufficient investment (or excess savings) requires a net capital outflow
that is the counterpart of a trade surplus.”).
157
See id. at 2–3 (discussing how trade imbalances require changes to macroeconomic
variables, which is why RTAs target microeconomic factors to increase trade levels rather
than trade balances).
158
See Theodore H. Moran, Will the TPP Create More Jobs for Americans? Why the Answer
is “No”!, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL’Y WATCH (July 7, 2015, 9:45
AM) (alteration in original), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/will-tppcreate-more-jobs-americans-why-answer-no [https://perma.cc/W82Z-CZTL] (stating that “the
number of jobs in an economy [is] a macroeconomic phenomen” which is a function of aggregate
demand for labor against the supply of labor).
159
See id. (arguing that any change in net exports will result only in a different allocation of
labor rather than any increase in demand for labor).
160
See id. (stating that central banks will respond to positive or negative effects of trade
policy on the labor market with monetary policy).
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market from an RTA that can represent an important economic burden in specific
sectors/communities. In the current political climate, trade has been singled out
as the main culprit for loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs.161 At the same time,
recent studies indicate that import competition from China over the past decade
has had a significant effect on the number of manufacturing job losses as well as
a negative impact on local job markets.162 There is also empirical evidence that
NAFTA had very strong local labor market effects in the United States, driving
down wage growth for blue-collar workers in the most affected industries and
geographic locations.163 It is not surprising therefore that TPP has been attacked
by politicians from both sides of the aisle as they tap into deep public concern
about the effects of globalization.164
However, some scholars expect that the TPP would not have had a
very large impact on U.S. employment.165 As resources continue to shift from
basic manufacturing to traded services and advanced manufacturing, TPP
was likely to favor skilled labor in the United States, given that the service
sector is skilled-labor intensive and basic manufacturing is capital/lowskilled labor intensive.166 While returns to all inputs would have increased
due to productivity gains, wages would have increased by more than returns
to capital, and wages of skilled workers would have increased more than
those of unskilled workers.167
161

See Donald J. Boudreaux, Trade Is Not a Job Killer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/opinion/trump-tariffs-trade-war.html [https://perma.cc/LKS9LSR3] (relating how President Trump has focused on trade-related issues as a primary cause
of job loss).
162
Daron Acemoglu et al., Import Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the
2000s, 34 U. CHI. J. LAB. ECON. 141, 160–162 (2016) (listing the job loss incurred by
American industry due to Chinese imports). See also David H. Autor et al., The China
Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM.
ECON. REV. 2121, 2125 (2013) (showing the negative consequences of low-income-country
imports causing unemployment and lost wages on local American labor markets).
163
See Shushanik Hakobyan & John McLaren, Looking for Local Labor Market Effects of
NAFTA, 98 REV. ECON. & STAT. 728, 729–30 (2016) (noting NAFTA’s negative effects on
American workers in local labor markets).
164
See Jason Margolis & Lucy Martirosyan, What is the TPP and Why Are Both Parties So
Angry About It?, PRI: THE WORLD (July 26, 2016, 4:45 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/
2016-07-26/what-tpp-and-why-are-both-parties-so-angry-about-it [https://perma.cc/YWB2Y6A8] (noting Democratic Senator Bernie Sanders’ and then-presidential-nominee Donald
Trump’s opposition to the TPP).
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See Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 10–11 (claiming that the TPP shouldn’t have very
much of an effect on unemployment).
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In terms of employment, it has been estimated that 71,900 jobs per year
in the United States would have been “shifted” over the period 2018–2028 due
to TPP, where job shifts account for inter-sectoral changes in jobs, i.e., jobs lost
in one sector(s) relative to jobs gained in another sector(s).168 If these job shifts
per year are reduced by 25%, which is the percentage of jobs shifted due to
voluntary and other separations, 53,700 annual job changes in the United States
would have been involuntary and attributable to TPP.169 Placing this in
perspective, fifty-five million jobs are “churned” a year in the United States, with
the TPP accounting for less than a 0.1% increase in the rate of churn.170
Nevertheless, while some workers displaced by TPP would have been
reemployed, others would have found it either harder due to age and location,
and/or they would have ended up getting jobs paying lower wages.171 As a
consequence, many economists,172 as well as commentators in the media173
have suggested that the United States should target strategies to support
workers who bear the cost of trade liberalization, including upgrading skills
through vocational training, helping workers find new jobs via job exchanges
and relocation grants, and developing a system of wage insurance to protect
workers against income loss.174 In other words, the objective is to get the
winners from trade to compensate those that lose. A more radical view argues
that policies relating to global economic integration should be rebalanced in
168

Id. at 20 (using U.S. data from 2014).
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
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See Robert Z. Lawrence & Tyler Moran, Adjustment and Income Distribution Impacts of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership 12–13 (Peterson Inst. Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 16-5, 2016),
https://piie.com/publications/working-papers/adjustment-and-income-distribution-impacts-transpacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/6ZWG-V565] (advocating for public unemployment insurance and public investment in human capital and training); see also Paul Krugman, Trade, Labor,
and Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/opinion/tradelabor-and-politics.html [https://perma.cc/E8CD-VS4F] (explaining that some European countries
do not suffer as much from structural unemployment because of sizeable social safety nets).
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See Trade, at What Price?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.economist.com/unit
ed-states/2016/04/02/trade-at-what-price (advocating for labor assistance programs for job
losses due to trade policies) [https://perma.cc/4HV5-WFNP]; see also Editorial, Jobs and
Trade on the Campaign Trail, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
04/03/opinion/sunday/jobs-and-trade-on-the-campaign-trail.html [https://perma.cc/BY66-C
BBM] (advocating for larger, European-style social safety nets, wage insurance, and subsidies
for businesses who rehire victims of trade policy).
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See Lawrence & Moran, supra note 172, at 2 (arguing for programs to aid victims of trade
policies, and specifically supporting an enhanced Trade-Adjustment Assistance program
with wage insurance).
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three ways: from capital and the business sector to labor and society at large,
from global to national governance, and to an outcome where the overall
benefits are larger.175
E. Sectoral Effects
The expected sectoral effects of TPP need to be placed in the overall
context of the structure of the U.S. economy. As of 2016, the U.S.
manufacturing sector accounted for 10.2% of employment — down from
14.3% in 2000 — a decline that has continued irrespective of U.S. trade
policy, driven by growth in productivity.176 Given that the U.S. economy is
unambiguously a service-oriented economy, it is perhaps not surprising that
the expected positive impact of TPP on trade would have been concentrated
in that sector, along with sectors such as agriculture and advanced
manufacturing, where the United States has clear comparative advantage.177
In light of this, it is interesting to examine what the expected benefits of TPP
were for the U.S. services and agricultural sectors, along with the automobile
sector, where the United States managed to bargain a degree of continued
protection for its domestic market against Japanese import competition.178
1. Trade in Services
Currently, the U.S. tradeable business services sector, which includes
financial services, R&D, healthcare, and education services, accounts for
25% of U.S. employment, and the sector enjoyed a trade surplus in crossborder transactions of $233 billion in 2014.179 The U.S. comparative
175

See Dani Rodrik, The Trouble with Globalization, MILKEN INSTIT. REV. (Oct. 20, 2017), http://
www.milkenreview.org/articles/the-trouble-with-globalization [https://perma.cc/2GTJ-HDKK]
(arguing that approaches to economic integration must change if globalization is to be saved).
176
See Robert Lawrence, Recent US Manufacturing Employment: The Exception that Proves the
Rule 2, 11, 13 (Peterson Inst. Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 17-12, 2017) https://piie.com/
system/files/documents/wp17-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/S686-Z38H] (explaining the tradeoff
between employment and labor productivity).
177
See Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 17 (noting that the TPP benefitted sectors in which
the United States had a comparative advantage, including service industries).
178
See Sarah Oliver, Auto Sector Liberalization, in 1 Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
Market Access and Sectoral Issues 60, 62 (2016), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb
16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ87-S5SB] (finding that the TPP maintained some protections for the
U.S. auto industry, and pointing to the continued high tariffs on trucks as an example).
179
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Liberalization of Services Trade, in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 81–82 (2016), https://piie.
com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ87-S5SB].
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advantage in services is based on three factors: the presence of large efficient
firms, highly educated personnel, and extensive use of information
technology.180 At present the sector faces high barriers to cross-border trade
with other TPP members, with overall ad valorem equivalent tariffs on
service imports estimated to range from 20% in Singapore to 73% in Mexico,
the average tariff equivalent in the financial services sector being 55%.181
There was considerable focus in the TPP negotiations on the services
sector, the final agreement covering 12 sectors and 168 subsectors. In
addition, four of the TPP chapters were targeted exclusively at a range of
issues relating to cross-border trade and investment in services.182
Essentially, TPP members agreed to “fair and equal” treatment for firms who
wanted to enter their markets through trade or investment or both, and any
unilateral liberalization offered by one TPP member would be offered to all
other TPP members.183 The bottom line: under TPP, member countries
committed to significantly reducing trade barriers, with U.S. service exports
expected to increase $149 billion by 2030, which accounts for 67% of overall
increased TPP trade in services.184 In the case of financial services, it is
important to note that while TPP committed members to increased market
access and non-discrimination, it would have essentially preserved national
sovereignty over this sector.185 Nevertheless, the TPP chapter was significant
for two reasons: first, post-financial crisis, it would have brought together a
set of countries with quite different financial sectors; second, commitments
by TPP members generated a set of standards for regulation of the sector,
which could then have been applied to countries such as China and Korea if
they subsequently chose to join TPP.
The TPP agreement also recognized the importance of proper
“prudential” financial regulation by members, which refers to rules such as
minimum capital requirements for banks and appropriate protections for
investors and depositors.186 Previous trade and investment agreements have
exempted such regulations from their scope, as long as they are not used to
undermine members’ commitments to an agreement.187 TPP contained such
180
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Anna Gelpern, Financial Services, in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP,
MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 91, 91 (2016), https://piie.com/system/files/doc
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a prudential “carve-out” which also covers national monetary and credit
policies, and financial emergency rescue policies such as the U.S. Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) implemented in 2008.188
2. TPP and Agriculture
Over the period 2010–12, agricultural imports by TPP members totaled
$279 billion.189 Fifty-one percent were sourced from other TPP partners, while
43% of their agricultural exports went to TPP partners.190 Canada and Mexico
are both highly dependent on other TPP members for agricultural exports and
imports, mostly due to their trade with the United States.191 For the United States
over the same period, 42% and 47% of its agricultural exports and imports
respectively went to or were sourced from other TPP members.192
Agricultural products traded between TPP members are currently
subject to higher applied tariffs on average than industrial products—7.6% vs.
1.5%—although bilateral protection varies considerably by country.193 For
example, average applied agricultural tariffs are 3.6% at the U.S. border
compared to 23% at the Japanese border.194 Agricultural tariffs also vary based
on whether trading partners are members of an existing RTA, and also by
product. For example, Mexico’s average applied agricultural tariff against TPP
members is 15.6%, ranging from 30.7% against Australia to 3.2% and 1% on
agricultural imports from Canada and the United States, its NAFTA
partners.195 In the case of specific agricultural products, different TPP members
currently have high levels of protection for different products. For example,
Canada protects its markets for dairy products, poultry and eggs, with its
average applied tariff on U.S. dairy products being 110% even though Canada
and the United States are both members of NAFTA.196 Japan protects its
188

See id. at 96.
MARY E. BURFISHER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ECONOMIC
RESEARCH REPORT NO. 176, AGRICULTURE IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 1 (2014),
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Winner Take It All? 11–12 (Ctr. Econ. Stud. & Ifo Inst., Working Paper No. 5460, 2015), https://
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markets for beef, rice, wheat, barley, sugar, dairy products, and selected fruit
and vegetables.197 Japan applied import duties on cereals exceeding 200%,
largely due to the level of protection afforded to its rice sector.198 In the case
of the United States, sugar, selected dairy products, and tobacco are protected,
with the applied tariff on tobacco products currently applied at 350%.199
In order to evaluate what might have been the extent and potential
impact of agricultural trade liberalization under the TPP agreement, it is
useful first to report the results of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
(USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS) study that estimated the impact
of removing all agricultural tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) by
2025.200Given the ERS study assumed removal of all existing barriers to
agricultural trade between TPP countries, this can be considered an upper
bound to what might have been the likely trade effects of TPP on the
agricultural sector. The USDA/ERS estimates indicate that TPP would result
in a 6.3% increase in agricultural trade by 2025.201 This increase would
account for an additional $8.5 billion in the agricultural marketplace.202 TPP
was also expected to increase U.S. market access to several countries where
it currently has no RTA, notably Japan, where 50% of U.S. agricultural
exports would have faced zero tariffs once TPP was implemented.203 In the
case of other agricultural products, preferential access would have been given
under new TRQs, where specified levels of imports would be subject to low
tariffs, including dairy products imported by Canada, and rice, wheat and
barley imported by Japan.204 With increased market access, USDA/ERS had
197
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of U.S. farm products (by value) will enter Japan duty free once the agreement is implemented .
. . includ[ing] grapes, strawberries, walnuts, lactose, certain fruit juices, and most pet foods.”)
204
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anticipated that TPP would result in the U.S. accounting for 33% and 10%
respectively of the overall increase in intra-TPP agricultural exports and
imports by 2025.205 Overall, the U.S. agricultural sector was expected to be a
big winner from implementation of TPP, exports to Japan accounting for a
large share of these trade gains.
Of course, while TPP was expected to result in considerable
liberalization of agricultural trade, the nature of the agreement was such that
there would have been a phase-in period across countries and products.206
Once the agreement took effect, almost 32% of tariff lines in Japan, 31% in
Vietnam, 92% in Malaysia, all but one tariff line in Australia, and 99% in
New Zealand were to be eliminated, with additional liberalization being
phased in over 15 to 20 years.207 However, significant barriers to market
access would have remained in some areas, notably the dairy sector, where
Canada, Japan and the United States backed off dairy sector reform in order
to maintain domestic support programs.208
3. Trade in Automobiles
TPP had the potential to more closely integrate the automobile industries
of the United and Japan, two of the largest in the world, as well as open up market
access to TPP members such as Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Vietnam.
Liberalization would have lowered tariffs, reduced non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
such as tax breaks for purchase of domestically-produced automobiles, and
begun a process of mutual recognition of safety and emissions standards.209
The United States and Japanese automobile sectors have three key
trade characteristics: first, Japanese exports exceed those of the United States;
second, Japanese exports are biased towards the U.S. market while the United
States has relatively low exports to Japan; and third, mostly as a result of
integration of the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican automobile sector via
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ87-S5SB] (providing
an example of how particularly thorny issues like Canadian dairy imports and Japanese rice
imports would be handled by the TPP treaty scheme).
205
See BURFISHER ET AL., supra note 189, at 23–24 (examining the impact of the TPP on
intra-TPP agricultural imports and exports by 2025).
206
Hendrix & Kotschwar, supra note 204, at 41 (noting that the gradual market liberalization
catalyzed by the TPP would unfold gradually over 15 to 20 years.).
207
Id.
208
Id. at 42.
209
See Oliver, supra note 178, at 60 (surveying the impact of the TPP on the American and
Japanese auto sectors, markets over which both countries had historically exercised trade
protections).
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NAFTA, the United States exports more than Japan to other TPP members.210
As a consequence, TPP was expected to expand market access for U.S.
automobiles to the Japanese and other TPP members’ markets, and at the
same time increase Japanese exports to Canada and Mexico, while lowering
its costs of exporting to the United States.211
In terms of import tariffs, the majority currently fall between 2% and
10%, the notable outliers being Malaysia, whose rates range between 30% to
40%, and Vietnam with rates extending up to 70% respectively.212 With the
exception of U.S. tariffs against Japanese imports of automobiles and trucks, all
automobile tariffs would have expired within twelve years of TPP being
implemented.213 However, at the same time as the proposed schedule for tariffcutting, the negotiated ROOs would have had a significant impact on trade
liberalization in the automobile sector: in order to qualify for zero-tariff rates, all
finished automobiles traded were required to contain 45% TPP-sourced
content.214 The objective of this ROO was to provide an incentive to U.S. and
Japanese automobile firms to source parts from countries such as Vietnam, and
represented a compromise for ROOs applied under NAFTA, and those that
Japan has previously negotiated in previous trade agree-ments.215 Overall, TPP
would have liberalized market access to developing country members such as
Malaysia and Vietnam where demand is growing, but the agreement essentially
focused on protecting the U.S. and Japanese automobile sectors through tradedistorting ROOs, and the slow expiration of import tariffs.216
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM TPP
A. Abandoning the Strategic Goals of TPP and its Economic Benefits
The withdrawal of the United States from TPP by the Trump Administration compromises major U.S. interests at least two ways. First, the United
States stands to lose the economic benefits that would have been created by its
membership in TPP that will be difficult to replicate. Second, the United States
210
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See id. at 61 (pointing out that under the TPP the reduction in tariffs would make Japanese
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loses the opportunity to lead a deep integration RTA setting standards for Asia
and containing China in international trade. Although the remaining eleven
members have signed the CPTPP, the United States was the main architect
behind TPP and would have been vigilant in policing and enforcing TPP
standards. Even if China were to join CPTPP, it seems doubtful whether any of
the remaining members have the economic clout or political will to vigorously
enforce TPP standards against China and other members. A third disadvantage
of withdrawing from TPP is that China now has the upper hand in promoting
RCEP, its own RTA for Asia.
When the United States drafted TPP, the strategic goal was to box in
China with the difficult of choice of joining TPP and being subjected to
“WTO-extra” standards that it had no hand in drafting, or ignoring TPP and
losing its trade benefits. While it should be clear that ignoring TPP would
have meant that China would not have enjoyed the benefits of free trade with
all TPP members, including the United States, it may be less clear that China
would also have suffered trade losses from non-participation in TPP. Like all
RTAs, TPP would have been a double edged sword: TPP could have both
created trade among its members and diverted trade from non-members.217
Importers in the United States faced with the choice of buying goods from
China and other TPP members would have had an economic incentive to
forgo goods from China (subject to WTO tariffs) and purchase the goods
from other TPP members, such as Vietnam and Japan, which would have
entered enter the United States tariff-free. In other words, China would have
felt pressure to join TPP because ignoring it would likely have harmed its
ability to export to the U.S., its largest and most important market. This was
the stark choice that TPP was designed to present to China.
B. RCEP
The exclusion of China from the TPP negotiations prompted China to
formally initiate talks for RCEP, a competing free trade agreement for Asia, in
2012. Comprised of sixteen nations, including the world’s two most populous
nations, China and India, RCEP, when completed and in effect, will include 45%
of the world’s population and 40% of world trade.218 Led by China, RCEP was
217
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intended to serve as an economic and strategic counter-weight to TPP. Of the
sixteen prospective members of RCEP, seven nations are potential members of
both TPP and RCEP, and ten nations are also members of another RTA, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).219
Unlike TPP, RCEP contains no substantive obligations on
environmental protection, workers’ rights, SOEs, and technology transfer. This
is consistent with all of China’s recent regional trade agreements, which also lack
any provisions on these subjects.220 Indeed, RCEP seems to further China’s
interest in promoting the use of fossil fuels such as coal. RCEP contains
provisions that are intended to promote the use of “dirty fuels” by reducing 90%
of tariffs on fossil fuels and by allowing its members to challenge
environmentally friendly regulations by other members as barriers to trade.221
While China is facing international pressure to reduce the use of “dirty fuels,”
RCEP is designed to protect China’s ability to do so in the vast Asian market.
Although RCEP lacks provisions on subjects such as workers’ rights,
RCEP is likely to contain a provision requiring members to respect the
right of self-determination in its members. Although the final text of RCEP is
still being negotiated and only drafts of some chapters have been leaked
to the public,222 it is possible to draw some lessons from the articles of
the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) established under the leadership
of Beijing to serve as a competitor to the U.S.-dominated World Bank in international lending for infrastructure and economic development projects.223 While
regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-issues-and-way-forward/ [https://perma.cc/
PUH2-CRHP].
219
See Yifei Xiao, Competitive Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) vs. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), C. UNDERGRADUATE RES.
ELECTRONIC J. 1, 5–7 (2015), http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/194 [https://perma.cc/4ZLN4MG7] (listing the members of the TPP, APEC and ASEAN agreements).
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overview of the enforceable commitments in China’s RTA’s).
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the World Bank seeks to promote the Washington Consensus, a set of policies
reflecting the western values of capitalism and free markets of the U.S. and its
European allies,224 the AIIB reflects the “Beijing Consensus,” a set of policies
endorsed by China that respects the rights of self-determination and sovereignty
of each nations to decide controversial issues such as environmental protection
and human rights free from the interference of other members.225 Article 31(2)
of its Articles of Agreement state that the AIIB, “its President, officers, and staff
shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member concerned.
Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions.”226 Although
the final text of RCEP has not been reached and made available to the public, it
seems highly likely that China, consistent with all of its recent trade agreements,
will seek to include basic tenets of the Beijing Consensus preserving the rights
of members to decide issues such as environmental protection and workers’ right
for themselves. In addition, it also seems likely that China will not include any
provisions limiting the activities of SOEs or technology transfer practices that
will harm its own interests.
With the withdrawal of the United States, China faces a weakened
CPTPP with greater confidence. RCEP creates economic benefits for China and
RCEP members, and perhaps more importantly, allows China to write the rules
of trade for Asia for the twenty first century and to cement its role as the leading
power in Asia.
CONCLUSION
The signing of TPP had the potential to have important economic
effects on its member countries in terms of growth in GDP, trade, and crossborder investment flows. However, its real significance lay beyond its initial
impact due to the fact that it has been considered to be pioneering a new type
of RTA that would have gone beyond shallow integration via tariff-cutting to
one addressing deep integration in terms of its provisions concerning trade in
services, FDI, rules on competition and regulatory harmonization.
224
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In terms of the mode of trade liberalization, TPP was considered as
having the potential to deliver additional economic benefits in the long run if
it provided a means to eventually untangling the Asia-Pacific “noodle bowl”
of multiple RTAs with their complex ROOs.227 Prior to 2000, many countries
in “Factory Asia” had unilaterally cut tariffs in order to take advantage of the
“unbundling” and offshoring of manufacturing processes by Japan.228 With
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, unilateral tariff-cutting in the region
was replaced by a rapid growth in RTAs, described as a “domino effect.”229
China itself started the process when it proposed and subsequently signed the
ASEAN-China agreement,230 with the reaction of countries such as Japan and
Korea leading to the so-called East Asian “noodle bowl.”231 Importantly, all
prospective TPP members were part of this growing network of Asia-Pacific
RTAs.232 For example, the United States already had RTAs with six TPP
members: Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore; four
members of TPP were already members of ASEAN: Brunei, Malaysia,
Singapore and Vietnam; and three members of TPP also had bilateral RTAs
with ASEAN: Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.233
These overlapping RTAs forming the “noodle bowl” should also be
seen in the context of the competing efforts to increase trade liberalization in
the region, such as the TPP versus RCEP, and the Free Trade Area of the
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) proposed in 2010 by the twenty-one member countries
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum.234 Importantly,
there is a view that TPP would have been more ambitious than RCEP in terms
of the extent of trade liberalization, and that economic benefits would be
greater from FTAAP being based on TPP as opposed to RCEP.235 Given this
227
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background, it is not surprising, therefore, that TPP also had the strategic goal
of allowing the United States to write the rules of trade for Asia and to contain
China’s most controversial trade practices.
Despite the strategic and economic benefits of the TPP, when Donald
J. Trump was elected to the U.S. Presidency, he decided to withdraw the
United States from TPP. It is unclear in making this decision whether the
Trump Administration studied or even considered the possible negative
consequences of this decision as set forth in this article. Rather than following
through with the existing strategy of writing the rules for trade in Asia while
isolating and boxing in China, the United States has chosen to rely instead on
threats of tariff increases in order to pressure countries into capitulating on
trade issues. It remains unclear whether a trade policy based on intimidation
against powerful countries capable of retaliating on equal terms, such as
China, will be the best long term approach.
While the U.S. withdrawal from TPP creates serious disadvantages for
the United States, the decision is reversible and the path to rejoin TPP is both
open and straightforward at the moment. Nothing prevents a nation that has left
TPP from rejoining so long as all existing members approve.236 Given the United
States’s role in spearheading the TPP and its economic clout, the CPTPP
members might be relieved by the reentry of the United States. Rejoining TPP
in the near future might allow the United States to regain the lost strategic and
economic benefits discussed in this article. In fact, the Trump Administration
considered rejoining TPP in April 2018 but ultimately balked.237
The United States should be cautioned, however, that a smooth path
to reentry into TPP may not be available indefinitely. The United States’s
departure from TPP has created a strategic opening for China. If China takes
advantage of the U.S. departure by joining TPP before the United States can
rejoin, China could make U.S. reentry much more difficult as the United
236
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States will need the approval of all existing TPP members to rejoin.238 China
could block or delay the United States from rejoining or seek to exact
concessions from the United States as the price of readmission. China could
also attempt to seize a leadership role in TPP in the absence of the United
States, relegating the United States to a diminished role upon its reentry. Even
if China decides against joining TPP, a U.S. delay in reasserting its presence
at the multilateral level in Asia could prove harmful. China will be able to
continue to strengthen its power in Asia through RCEP, which has purposely
excluded the United States, and other initiatives, such as “One Belt, One
Road,”239 an immensely vast and ambitious trade project, while the United
States remains on the outside. As the case of the AIIB illustrates, China is
intent on dominating trade in Asia, aggressively defending its interests in
Asia against U.S. intrusion, and seeking a leadership position in international
trade.240 At the moment, the U.S. strategy in Asia appears to be limited to one
of intimidation through threats of tariff increases. Aside from tariff increases,
the United States appears to be at a standstill or a point of indecision about
its trade policy in Asia and any next steps in Asia or the rest of the world. The
U.S. withdrawal from TPP, without further action by the United States such
as a reversal of the decision, could shift the balance of power over trade and
economic relations in Asia and then globally to China.
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